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Add text on hash in KB-JWT (#353)
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* Improve structure of specification

* Fix references

* serialized format for the SD-JWT figure: adding a newline so (hopefully) the horizontal scrollbar in the HTML output doesn't cover up the contentUpdate draft-ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt.md

* Update draft-ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt.md

Co-authored-by: Kristina <[email protected]>

* Update draft-ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt.md

Co-authored-by: Kristina <[email protected]>

* Apply suggestions from code review

* Remove KB-JWT header example

Co-authored-by: Brian Campbell <[email protected]>

* Move three subsections out of 'Data Format Details' and remove that section

* Reformat list of SD-JWT payload requirements and note on line breaks

* Add text on hash in KB-JWT

* Add instructions on checking hash and hash algorithm

* Uppercase Presentation

* Adapt wording in concepts section

* Document history

* Add IANA registration for new claim

* Improve wording in Integrity of Presentation

* Update draft-ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt.md

Co-authored-by: Brian Campbell <[email protected]>

* Update draft-ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt.md

Co-authored-by: Brian Campbell <[email protected]>

* Remove trailing whitespace

* Update draft-ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt.md

Co-authored-by: Orie Steele <[email protected]>

* Apply suggestions from Joseph's code review

* Update draft-ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt.md

---------

Co-authored-by: Daniel Fett <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Brian Campbell <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Kristina <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Orie Steele <[email protected]>
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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion .github/workflows/ghpages.yml
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ jobs:
- name: "Install SD-JWT tooling"
run: |
python3 -m pip install --upgrade pip
python3 -m pip install git+https://github.com/openwallet-foundation-labs/sd-jwt-python.git
python3 -m pip install git+https://github.com/openwallet-foundation-labs/sd-jwt-python.git@danielfett/kb-jwt-hash
# Build the local examples
- name: "Build local examples"
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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion .github/workflows/publish.yml
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ jobs:
- name: "Install SD-JWT tooling"
run: |
python3 -m pip install --upgrade pip
python3 -m pip install git+https://github.com/openwallet-foundation-labs/sd-jwt-python.git
python3 -m pip install git+https://github.com/openwallet-foundation-labs/sd-jwt-python.git@danielfett/kb-jwt-hash
# Build the local examples
- name: "Build local examples"
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59 changes: 47 additions & 12 deletions draft-ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -224,11 +224,12 @@ Key Binding is an optional feature. When Key Binding is required by the use-case

Note: How the public key is included in SD-JWT is out of scope of this document. It can be passed by value or by reference.

The Holder can then create a signed document, the Key Binding JWT as defined in (#kb-jwt), using its private key. This document contains some
data provided by the Verifier such as a nonce to ensure the freshness of the signature, and audience to indicate the
intended audience for the document.

The Key Binding JWT can be included as part of the SD-JWT and sent to the Verifier as described in (#data_formats).
For presenting an SD-JWT to a Verifier that enforces Key Binding, the Holder
creates a signed document, the Key Binding JWT as defined in (#kb-jwt), using
its private key. This document contains a nonce to ensure the freshness of the signature, an audience value to
indicate the intended audience for the document, and a hash that ensures the
integrity of the data sent from the Holder to the Verifier. Details of the format of Key Binding JWTs are
described in (#kb-jwt).

Note that there may be other ways to send a Key Binding JWT to the Verifier or for the Holder to prove possession of the key material included in an SD-JWT. In these cases, inclusion of the Key Binding JWT in the SD-JWT is not required.

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -521,13 +522,35 @@ The JWT MUST contain the following elements:
* `iat`: REQUIRED. The value of this claim MUST be the time at which the Key Binding JWT was issued using the syntax defined in [@!RFC7519].
* `aud`: REQUIRED. The intended receiver of the Key Binding JWT. How the value is represented is up to the protocol used and out of scope of this specification.
* `nonce`: REQUIRED. Ensures the freshness of the signature. The value type of this claim MUST be a string. How this value is obtained is up to the protocol used and out of scope of this specification.
* `_sd_hash`: REQUIRED. The base64url-encoded hash digest over the Issuer-signed JWT and the selected Disclosures as defined below.

### Integrity Protection of the Presentation {#integrity-protection-of-the-presentation}

The hash digest in `_sd_hash` ensures the integrity of the Presentation. It MUST
be taken over the US-ASCII bytes preceding the KB-JWT in the Presentation, i.e.,
the Issuer-signed JWT, a tilde character, and zero or more Disclosures selected
for presentation to the Verifier, each followed by a tilde character:

```
<Issuer-signed JWT>~<Disclosure 1>~<Disclosure 2>~...~<Disclosure N>~
```

The bytes of the digest MUST then be base64url-encoded.

The same hash algorithm as for the Disclosures MUST be used (defined by
the `_sd_alg` element in the Issuer-signed JWT or the default value, as defined
in (#hash_function_claim)).

### Validating the Key Binding JWT

To validate the signature on the Key Binding JWT, the Verifier MUST use the key material in the SD-JWT. If it is not clear from the SD-JWT, the Key Binding JWT MUST specify which key material the Verifier needs to use to validate the Key Binding JWT signature using JOSE header parameters such as `kid` and `x5c`.

Whether to require Key Binding is up to the Verifier's policy, based on the set
of trust requirements such as trust frameworks it belongs to. See
(#key_binding_security) for security considerations.

### Alternatives to a Key Binding JWT

Other ways of proving Key Binding MAY be used when supported by the Verifier,
e.g., when the presented SD-JWT without a Key Binding JWT is itself embedded in a
signed JWT. See (#enveloping) for details.
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -721,7 +744,8 @@ To this end, Verifiers MUST follow the following steps (or equivalent):
5. Check that the `typ` of the Key Binding JWT is `kb+jwt`.
6. Check that the creation time of the Key Binding JWT, as determined by the `iat` claim, is within an acceptable window.
7. Determine that the Key Binding JWT is bound to the current transaction and was created for this Verifier (replay protection) by validating `nonce` and `aud` claims.
8. Check that the Key Binding JWT is valid in all other respects, per [@!RFC7519] and [@!RFC8725].
8. Calculate the digest over the Issuer-signed JWT and Disclosures as defined in (#integrity-protection-of-the-presentation) and verify that it matches the value of the `_sd_hash` claim in the Key Binding JWT.
9. Check that the Key Binding JWT is valid in all other respects, per [@!RFC7519] and [@!RFC8725].

If any step fails, the Presentation is not valid and processing MUST be aborted.

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -800,7 +824,7 @@ Key Binding is achieved by the signature on the enclosing JWT.
}
```

Other specifications or profiles of this specification may define alternative formats for transporting an SD-JWT that envelope multiple such SD-JWTs into one object and provide Key Binding using means other than the Key Binding JWT.
Other specifications or profiles of this specification may define alternative formats for transporting an SD-JWT that envelope multiple such SD-JWTs into one object and provide Key Binding and integrity protection of the presentation using means other than the Key Binding JWT.


# Security Considerations {#security_considerations}
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -924,10 +948,6 @@ particular use case and the Key Binding is not present, does not fulfill the req
Key Binding data is present in the SD-JWT, the Verifier will reject the
presentation, as described in (#verifier_verification).

### Key Binding JWT

Issuer provided integrity protection of the SD-JWT payload and Disclosures is achieved by the signature on the Issuer-signed JWT that covers the SD-JWT payload including the digest values of the Disclosures as described in (#sec-is-jwt) and (#sec-disclosures), respectively. The Key Binding JWT, defined in (#kb-jwt), serves exclusively as a mechanism for the Holder to demonstrate possession of the private key corresponding to the public key in the SD-JWT payload. As such, the signature on the Key Binding JWT does not cover other parts of the SD-JWT. In cases where it's desirable for the Holder's signature to convey more than a proof-of-possession, such as signing over the selected Disclosures to prove those were the Disclosures selected, the SD-JWT to be presented can be embedded in another JWT (as described in [Enveloping SD-JWTs](#enveloping)) or otherwise signed by the Holder via the application protocol delivering it.

## Blinding Claim Names {#blinding-claim-names}

SD-JWT ensures that names of claims that are selectively disclosable are
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -983,6 +1003,13 @@ when presenting to a downstream party.
In some scenarios this behavior could be desirable,
but if it is not, Issuers need to support and Verifiers need to enforce Key Binding.

## Integrity of Presentation

In a Presentation, the Issuer-signed JWT is integrity-protected by the Issuer's
signature, and the Disclosures are integrity-protected by the digests included
in the Issuer-signed JWT. If used, the KB-JWT, besides proving Key Binding, protects the integrity of the
set of Disclosures the Holder disclosed.

## Explicit Typing {#explicit_typing}

Section 3.11 of [@RFC8725] describes the use of explicit typing to prevent confusion attacks
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1156,10 +1183,17 @@ IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry [@IANA.JWT] established by [@!RFC7519].
<br/>

* Claim Name: `_sd_alg`
* Claim Description: Hash algorithm used to generate disclosure digests
* Claim Description: Hash algorithm used to generate disclosure digests and digest over presentation
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): [[ (#hash_function_claim) of this specification ]]

<br/>

* Claim Name: `_sd_hash`
* Claim Description: Digest of the Issuer-signed JWT and Disclosures in a Presentation
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): [[ (#kb-jwt) of this specification ]]

## Media Type Registration

This section requests registration of the following media types [@RFC2046] in
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1626,6 +1660,7 @@ data. The original JSON data is then used by the application. See

-06

* Added hash of Issuer-signed part and Disclosures in KB-JWT
* Fix minor issues in some examples
* Added IANA media type registration request for the JSON Serialization
* More precise wording around storing artifacts with sensitive data
Expand Down

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